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ABSTRACT
Transfer pricing has become one of the main issues in the Malaysian tax 
perspectives since the pioneer legal case has proven to attract more scrutiny 
and supervision of the related authorities. In 2012, the comprehensive act by 
the Inland Revenue board to replace the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2007 
is believed to curb any manipulation and malpractice among related party 
transactions. This study aims to examine the relationships between three 
risk indicators of transfer pricing and the probability of transfer mispricing 
practices among Public Listed Companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. Using a 
micro backward-looking approach for seventy companies consisting of 350 
firm-years provides evidence that the number of tax haven subsidiaries and 
gross profit margin affected the extent of Effective Tax Rate yielded. These 
findings show that transfer pricing practices among PLCs may amount to 
a serious tax evasion scheme if the practices are not properly controlled 
and monitored by the authorities. 
Keywords: Transfer pricing, tax evasion, tax planning, related party 
transactions 
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INTRODUCTION
Issues on financial crimes are vastly discussed as organizations from time 
to time tend to discover new ways in manipulating their financial data with 
the ultimate aim of enjoying higher return, seeking financial assistance, 
maintaining consistent profitability trends or even an attempt to reduce 
their tax liabilities. Reduction in tax liabilities through tax evasion favours 
most of the attention since tax revenue is one of the main sources of 
income. For example, the Christian Aid Report (2010) reported that transfer 
mispricing and false invoicing are two major forms of tax evasion involving 
multinational corporations (MNC) that resulted in depriving tax revenues 
of developing countries amounting to USD160 billion every year.
Corporate tax revenue contributes around 30% of total tax revenue 
collected by the US government in 2013 amounting to USD350 billion 
(Zucman, 2014). To date, corporate tax planning is the main focus of the 
public as they are concern about the sources of the tax revenue and fair 
contribution from the relevant entities (PWC Tax Strategy and Corporate 
Reputation, 2013). According to Gravelle (2015), tax avoidance is 
considered to be a legal reduction from the tax perspectives while tax 
evasion is a reduction scheme that is illegitimate.
In Malaysia, there is a provision in the Income Tax Act (ITA) 1967 
regarding wilful evasion of tax covered under Section 114 which is further 
explained in the Public Ruling No.8/2000. The government views tax fraud 
as a serious offence whereby the punishment includes imprisonment as well 
as imposition of fine on the perpetrators (Income Tax Act 1967, 2014). In 
2012, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) solved nearly RM1.9 
billion worth of tax evasion cases (New Sabah Times, 2013). Furthermore, 
from the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) website, there is a significant 
number of cases being investigated which also involves tax fraud cases 
among companies in Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2015). 
Transfer pricing refers to intercompany pricing arrangements for the 
transfer of goods, services, and intangibles. A country would suffer huge 
loss if transfer pricing practices are not properly controlled and monitored 
as a firm can divert taxable income to its foreign subsidiaries to minimise 
its overall tax burden and increase the parent’s overall earnings (Olibe & 
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Rezaee, 2008). On the other hand, transfer mispricing or known as transfer 
price manipulation (TPM) is a strategic setting of transfer price above or 
below opportunity cost so as to avoid government controls and/or arbitrage 
differences in regulations between countries (Horst, 1971; Eden 1998 & 
Eden 2003). Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a Washington-based research 
and advisory organization estimated that the amount of tax revenue loss 
worldwide from transfer mispricing is at several hundred billion dollars 
annually (Tax Justice Network USA, 2015).  
This paper integrates three out of nine indicators outlined by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
guidelines for dealing effectively with challenges of transfer pricing (OECD, 
2012). The three selected indicators are (1) significant transactions with 
related parties in low tax jurisdictions, (2) loss-making, and (3) effective tax 
rates. Besides, tax planning theory is the theory used to support the selection 
of the three variables. Hence, this study aims to examine the relationships 
between three risk indicators of transfer pricing and the probability of 
transfer mispricing practices among Public Listed Companies (PLCs). 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Transfer Pricing
Transfer pricing is the price charged for transactions between 
companies that are associated, such as trade between a parent company and 
its foreign subsidiary or between two affiliates (Eden, 2009). According to 
Tax Research UK (2010), approximately 70% of the world trade nowadays 
involve related parties transaction. The arm’s length price is on top of 
discussion as the price is set based on discretionary estimation without 
considering the arm’s length (AL) principle and subsequently evolves 
into “transfer mispricing”. The AL price can be found in Article 9 of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as 
it governs the prices at which intra-firm transfers are set for tax purposes 
(Keuschnigg & Devereux, 2013).
 
344
malaysian accounting review, volume 15 no. 1, 2016
The GFI report estimated that 80% of the unrecorded financial outflows 
in Malaysia amounting to USD$227.1 billion during 2001-2010 were due to 
trade mispricing and listed Malaysia in the top ten ranking for the most illicit 
financial flow coming out of the country compared with other developing 
countries such as China, Russia, India, and Mexico (Kar & Freitas, 2012). 
The pioneer legal case of alleged transfer pricing manipulation in Malaysia 
involved MM Sdn Bhd. However, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2012 
issued by IRBM had no lawful impact on the case as it was merely a 
guideline for companies to follow (Quantera Global, 2013). 
 
The IRBM had come up with a new Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 
2012. The guidelines serve as a medium to further define the transfer pricing 
aspects as per outlined in the Section 140A of the Income Tax Act (ITA) 
1967. Also, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) guidelines for dealing effectively with transfer pricing was also 
issued in 2012. It contains recommendations on mitigating transfer pricing 
in an effective manner. 
Tax Planning
Tax planning deals with the organization of a taxpayer’s affair to 
have effects on the minimum tax liability within the law which is a legal 
approach that deals with the choice of a business vehicle and the use of 
options or tax shelters (Kasipillai, 2010). According to Pniowsky (2010), 
tax planning is the process of structuring one’s affairs to defer, reduce, 
or even eliminate the amount of tax payable. Notably, there is a need for 
MNC to properly manage their tax bills through available incentives and 
rebates offered by the countries they reside in as they face various types 
of taxes in return. However, further complication arises by the additional 
cost of compliance the company might face to comply with the different 
administrative requirements that may differ from one country to another 
(OECD, 2010).
In Malaysia, tax planning is legal as long as it is executed through 
proper means but still vulnerable for manipulation. The government of 
Malaysia has their way in boosting foreign direct investment to erect the 
business locally. The implementation of several tax incentive schemes such 
as Pioneer Status (PS), Investment Tax Allowance (ITA), and Reinvestment 
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Allowance (RA) is considered as the most prominent incentive offered 
to the foreign businesses (Hoe, 2011). The tax planning theory is used to 
complement the study as such planning is one type of subjective initiatives 
taken by a company in reducing their tax.
The nine criteria provided by OECD (2012) in dealing effectively with 
the challenges of transfer pricing are as follows: (1) Significant transactions 
with related parties in low tax jurisdictions; (2) Transfers of intangibles to 
related parties; (3) Business restructurings; (4) Specific types of payments; 
(5) Loss making; (6) Poor results; (7) Effective Tax Rates; (8) Poor/Non-
existent documentation; and (9) Excessive debt. However, the study only 
focused on three (3) of the risk indicators which are low tax jurisdictions 
(ordinary subsidiaries and tax haven subsidiaries), loss making, and effective 
tax rates due to the constraints in gathering other risk indicators. The three 
risk indicators selected are in conjunction with the tax planning theory since 
they might become a motivation for companies to manage their tax bill. 
Subsidiaries and Tax Planning
Subsidiary is a company controlled by a holding or parent company 
(Oxford Dictionary, 2015) and it includes direct subsidiary, indirect 
subsidiary, joint venture companies, as well as, associate companies. On 
the other hand, two companies are associated companies respectively to 
each other if one of the companies has shares or participates directly or 
indirectly in the management, control, or capital of the other company or 
both companies (IRBM, 2012). 
MNC usually has businesses that comprise of multiple locations 
in different regions. Due to the geographical constraint to monitor the 
businesses, MNC tends to construct subsidiaries under their belt to undertake 
their daily chores. They have displayed an emergent trend to expand through 
establishing subsidiaries, either through buying the already-existing or 
creating new companies (Eisenberg, 1971). In the context of transfer pricing 
practice, subsidiaries refer to the related-party transaction with the aim of 
providing tax advantages (Young, 2011). 
Subsidiary is selected as one of the independent variables since it 
might be utilized by the parent company to minimize their tax liability. 
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According to Hong, Pak, and Pak (2014), apart from gaining operational 
efficiency, multinational companies are also known to use vertical 
integration for better tax planning via trades with their own subsidiaries 
situated in dissimilar counties. Hong, Pak, and Pak’s (2014) affirmation is 
also based on the mutual findings as per Green (1986) and Drucker (2010).
Tax Haven Subsidiaries and Tax Planning
Tax haven features are defined based on the low or no taxes, insufficient 
effective information change and transparency, bank secrecy, and requires 
little or no substantial economic activity for an entity to obtain legal status 
(Gravelle, 2015). A tax haven subsidiary is a subsidiary that meets the 
stipulated requirements of tax haven. The existence of tax haven is noticeable 
in developing countries as they induce foreign businesses through low tax 
rates on various business activities (Kasipillai, 2010). Besides developing 
countries, there are other countries recognized as tax haven countries by 
the MNCs whereby they systematically charge different prices for internal 
transactions or report higher profits in low-tax countries (Egger & Seidel, 
2013). However, there is a need to regularly review the tax haven operation 
and its rates in preventing illegal activities in the global financial markets 
particularly on the inappropriate activities (Christensen, 2011). Thus, tax 
haven subsidiaries are tested to provide a more thorough analysis, aside 
from just the normal subsidiaries.
Gross Profit Margin and Tax Planning
According to the OECD guidelines, the firm’s gross income is one of 
the items closely related to transfer pricing issue as it forms part of the cost 
of sales. The gross income is to complement the consecutive loss aspect 
which may result in aggressive tax planning. The move is also parallel with 
the IRBM Guidelines whereby the scope of examination of a firm’s transfer 
pricing practices apply wholly to a business with gross income exceeding 
RM25 million and the total amount of related party transactions exceeding 
RM15 million (IRBM, 2012). Thus, the selection of the gross profit margin 
is based on the OECD’s risk indicators that emphasize on the loss-making 
firms (where gross profit value is the method to gauge the profit or loss 
of a company), as well as the IRBM Guidelines that enforce the transfer 
pricing guidelines to companies which meet the threshold of more than 
RM15 million gross profit.
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Effective Tax Rates and Tax Planning
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is the actual amount paid by the firm whereby 
Statutory Tax Rate (STR) is the amount of tax subject to the aggregate for 
the current year. The tax gap is the difference between ETR and STR which 
ETR shall not differ much from the stipulated STR. The variability of the 
ETR among PLCs from year to year shall raise a considerable concern as 
it happens to be that a firm double their tax bill and on other occasions they 
pay less or do not pay anything. Indeed, the amount paid sometimes does 
not reflect the tax liability a company is supposed to remit. 
The transfer pricing method is greatly used in reducing taxes, reducing 
tariffs, and avoiding exchange controls (Kasipillai, 2010). Olibe and Rezaee 
(2008) used the US effective tax rate (ETRUS) to examine the cross-
sectional relation between the values of cross-border intra-firm transfers 
(CITs). The other variables tested are Return on Investment (ROI) and 
Global Effective Tax Rate (ETRGL). The result indicates that both ETRUS 
and ROI increase whereas the ETRGL decreases with the extent of CITs. 
This proposes that firms earn income on average, in jurisdictions with tax 
rates greater than the USA, by diverting income from overseas as tax-saving 
action. In this study, ETR was used as the transfer pricing indicators as there 
are limited studies that applied ETR to measure transfer pricing practices. 
Perceived Transfer Mispricing Practices and Tax Planning
Transfer pricing practices are carried out to meet a company’s certain 
objectives and evolve into a negative connotation as “transfer mispricing”. 
The impact of transfer mispricing is that firms escape from paying higher tax 
and the tax revenue for a country will be lesser. Clausing (2003) investigated 
the impact of tax influences on intra-firm trade which proved a significant 
relationship between countries tax rates and the prices of related party 
transaction as the vibrant economic environment provides them with the 
tax-related incentives and exemption. 
Meanwhile, Sikka, and Willmott (2010) argued that firms consider 
transfer pricing is still an area where detection from the regulatory bodies 
is low and deemed as an acceptable business risk. Similarly, Christensen 
(2011) also argued that firms use tax haven countries to exploit legislative 
gaps and loose regulation as it provides an open gateway to do business.
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Uyanik (2010) highlighted that the revenue gain from ending deferral 
estimated to be around USD$11 billion. It could be an overstatement 
because some of the profits abroad accrue to real investments in countries 
that have lower tax rates than the United States and thus do not reflect 
artificial shifting. It could also be an understatement because it does not 
reflect the tax that could be collected by the United States rather than foreign 
jurisdictions on profits shifted to low-tax countries. Hong, Pak, and Pak 
(2014) also concur with Sikka and Willmott (2010). They suggested that 
multinational corporations tend to shift their income to both developed and 
developing countries through the transfer pricing channel to avoid taxes 
and other additional charges levied on them.
Hypotheses Development 
Relationship between Subsidiaries and Tax Haven Subsidiar-
ies with Effective Tax Rate (ETR)
Related party transaction (RPT) is one of the approaches in assessing 
transfer pricing practices. However, ETR is used as the basis to measure 
transfer pricing practices among PLCs in Malaysia due to some constraints 
to acquire data regarding RPT. Variability of ETR yielded by companies 
should be complemented with the explanation such as lower than 10% ETR 
might be one scheme related to transfer pricing (Gupta & Newberry, 1997). 
OECD (2012) highlighted that significant transaction with related parties in 
low tax jurisdictions is one of the features that may suggest transfer pricing 
risk. Therefore, the subsidiaries held by the PLCs are categorised between 
normal subsidiaries as well as tax haven subsidiaries. The measurement is 
as per unit basis, as the number of subsidiaries or tax haven subsidiaries 
that PLCs possessed will be recorded and analyzed to seek whether these 
variables affect the PLC’s ETR. The higher the number of subsidiaries or 
tax haven subsidiaries a PLC possessed, the lesser the ETR yielded by them. 
The result will be referring to a probability of transfer pricing manipulation. 
Therefore,
H1:	 There	is	a	significant	negative	relationship	between	the	number	
of	subsidiaries	a	PLC	possessed,	and	the	extent	of	ETR	yielded.
H2:	 There	is	a	significant	negative	relationship	between	the	number	
of	 tax	haven	subsidiaries	a	PLC	possessed,	and	 the	extent	of	
ETR	yielded.
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Relationship between Gross Profit Margin and Effective Tax 
Rate (ETR)
OECD (2012) suggested gross profit as another feature to handle 
transfer pricing risk. The variable is developed using the gross profit margin 
to determine loss-making firms as the actual feature suggested by the 
governing body is loss making or yielding poor results. The usage of gross 
profit is due to the scope of IRBM’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2012 that 
covers firms with gross profit exceeding RM25 million. The effect should 
be the higher the amount of gross profit margin of a PLC, the higher the 
ETR yielded by them. This is possible because a general understanding of 
tax is that more profit will lead to more tax to be paid. Therefore,
H3:	 There	is	a	significant	positive	relationship	between	gross	profit	
margin	incurred	by	a	PLC	and	the	extent	of	ETR	yielded.
METHODOLOGY
Sampling Technique
The population of the study consisted of 70 PLCs in Malaysia. As 
per OECD’s guidelines, MNCs were selected within the same industry, 
that is, 10 companies for each industry in order to ease the comparability 
analysis. Thus, 7 industries consisting of 350 firm-years for the year 2009 
to 2013 were selected.
The least requirement of the PLCs selected that fulfil the risk indicators 
for transfer pricing practices is it has subsidiary companies. The samples 
selected should also fulfil the condition of having gross profit exceeding 
RM25 million. This is to align with IRBM’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(2012) whereby the focus is on the PLCs that meet the thresholds in order for 
the investigation to be initiated. The guideline in fact covers companies that 
exceed RM25 millions of gross profit alongside more than RM15 millions 
of related-party transaction. 
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Measurement of Variables
ETR is the dependent variable that was yielded for the five years 
period, as Olibe and Rezaee (2008) had used ETRUS. This is consistent 
with Jacob (1996) and Mills and Newberry’s (2003) findings. The ETR was 
derived by dividing the tax expense (or tax income) with the profit before 
tax (pre-tax income). According to Gupta and Newberry (1997), ETR is 
considered as normal if it is around 10% to 25%, while it is considered as 
low if it is less than 10%.
The first independent variable is the number of subsidiaries a 
PLC possessed which include local and foreign subsidiaries. Tax haven 
subsidiaries possessed by a PLC would be the second independent variable 
that is based on the criteria of OECD’s List of Tax Haven Countries 2000 
which was updated in 2006. Both variables were only based on the respective 
PLCs Annual Report in 2013 to depict the landscape for five consecutive 
years as Bursa Malaysia Disclosure Guide 2011 required a comprehensive 
disclosure with regards to the subsidiaries and related-party transactions 
of PLCs only in 2011. 
Moreover, the PLCs pattern of having “continuous losses”, that is for 
two or more than two years would become the third independent variable. 
This is because some firms may plan to suffer losses to avoid paying taxes. 
The data were gathered from the gross profit margin or gross loss sustained 
by the PLCs which the amounts were available from Thomson DataStream 
2015. Thus, it is a vital area to know whether it has any relationship with 
transfer pricing practices if the company’s gross profit margin increases 
dramatically which most probably erroneous action may take place or it may 
as well lead to fraud (Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht & Zimbelman, 2009). 
The equation is as per below:-
ETR = β0 + β1 NOS + β2 THS + β3 GPM + ϵ
Where,
ETR = Effective Tax Rate
NOS = Number of Subsidiaries
THS = Tax Haven Subsidiaries
GPM = Gross Profit Margin
ϵ = Error
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Table 1: Definition and Measurement of Variables
Variable  
Acronym Definition Measurement
NOS Number of Subsidiaries The number of subsidiaries (local and 
foreign) a PLC possessed.
THS Tax Haven Subsidiaries The number of tax haven countries a 
PLC possessed.
GPM Gross Profit Margin Dividing gross profit by net sales
ETR Effective Tax Rates Dividing the tax expense (or tax 
income) with the profit before tax (pre-
tax income).
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics on dependent and 
independent variable respectively over the period of five years.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistic for Dependent Variable
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
ETR 350 281.7678 -111.4841 170.2837 20.392530 22.6778465
It shows that on average, ETR stands at 20.39%, which means that 
most of the PLC’s ETR are within the normal range as suggested by Gupta 
and Newberry (1997).
Table 3: Descriptive Statistic for Independent Variables
Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
NOS 179 2 179 27.46 33.446
THS 32 0 32 1.19 4.260
GPM 203.5182 -109.6939 93.8243 28.790781 21.4845165
Based on the result above, the mean value for the number of subsidiaries 
is high, approximately 27 subsidiaries possessed by a firm, within the range 
of 2 to 179. Meanwhile, mean value of 1.19 for the number of tax haven 
subsidiaries is reasonably high as one PLC is subject to have at least one tax 
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haven subsidiary. This is not an issue as utilization of tax haven countries 
is legal even though it might be used as a vehicle to reduce tax and acquire 
lower tax liability. While for gross profit margin, it indicates generation of 
28.79% gross profit from the sales. This may suggest strong profitability 
indicators as the majority of the PLCs are producing good profits in average 
even though there are PLCs which suffer huge losses.
Table 4: Proportion of ETR Across 5-years Period
ETR 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Low (<10%) 14 18 18 14 22
Normal (10%-25%) 25 27 26 29 23
High (>25%) 31 25 26 27 25
Total PLCs 70 70 70 70 70
Table 4 represents the number of PLCs having low ETR for each year 
is lesser as compared to normal and high ETR groups.  
Table 5: Proportion of Low ETR Across 5-years Period
Low ETR (<10%) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Industrial 3 3 1 3 4
Trading/Services 1 1 2 1 1
Construction 2 3 3 1 4
Properties 1 3 3 1 1
Consumer Products 1 1 2 2 2
Plantation 0 1 1 1 3
Technology 6 6 6 5 7
Total PLCs 14 18 18 14 22
Table 5 depicts the proportion of low ETR across 5-year period divided 
by seven different industries. All industries generated lower level of ETR 
except for technology-based industry as out of ten companies, there are 
more than five companies that have low ETR rates for each consecutive 
year. This may be due to lots of trading from outside countries to procure 
the technological-based items or equipment. This study focused only on 
the low ETR yielded since this indicates firm paid less tax as compared to 
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the actual amount which should trigger tax authority alert, as the company 
may do a proper tax planning or might as well a tax evasion scheme. 
Results Interpretation
Table 6: Details of R Square
R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change Statistics
R 
Square 
Change
F 
Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
Durbin-
Watson
.324a .105 .098 .9370126 .105 13.573 3 346 .000 1.723
a. Predictors: (Constant), Normal Score of GPM using Van der Waerden’s Formula, Normal  Score of NOS using Van der 
Waerden’s Formula, Normal Score of THS using Van der Waerden’s Formula
b. Dependent Variable: Normal Score of ETR using Van der Waerden’s Formula
Based on Table 6, R-square is only 10.5% which means the contribution 
is around 10% to the overall effect of transfer pricing practices of PLCs in 
Malaysia. Meanwhile, Durbin-Watson score is 1.723 that is nearer to 2 which 
indicates positive autocorrelation among the samples as per suggested by 
Pallant (2010) since The Durbin-Watson statistic is always between 0 and 4.
Table 7: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Table
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 35.751 3 11.917 13.573 .000b
Residual 303.785 346 .878
Total 339.536 349
a. Dependent Variable: Normal Score of ETR using Van der Waerden’s Formula
b. Predictors: (Constant), Normal Score of GPM using Van der Waerden’s Formula, Normal Score of NOS using Van der 
Waerden’s Formula, Normal Score of THS using Van der Waerden’s Formula
From Table 7 above, the F-value is 13.573 which is significant at p 
< .001. The F-value or F-ratio is the variance explained relative to error in 
the model (Field, 2009). The F-critical is [Df (3,346) =2.37], thus F-value 
is larger than the F-critical so it rejects the null hypothesis. Hence, there is 
evidence that at least one independent variable affects the extent of ETR 
yielded.
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Table 8: Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .017 .051 .332 .740
Normal Score of NOS using 
Van der Waerden’s Formula
.368 .064 .365 5.737 .000*
Normal Score of THS using 
Van der Waerden’s Formula
-.231 .088 -.167 -2.620 .009*
Normal Score of GPM using 
Van der Waerden’s 
.145 .051 .145 2.836 .005*
a. Dependent Variable: Normal Score of ETR using Van der Waerden’s Formula
    *Significant at 5% level (1-tailed test);
The regression equation is read from the above model as per below:
ETR = β0 + β1 NOS + β2 THS + β3 GPM + ϵ
ETR = 0.017 + 0.368 (NOS) – 0.231 (THS) + 0.145 (GPM) + ϵ
Table 8 shows the regression coefficient; β0 is valued at 0.017. This 
means that when there is no factor that affects the extent of ETR yielded by 
PLCs (when X = 0), the model predicts that ETR yielded will be 1.7%, before 
taking into account the effect which comes from a number of subsidiaries, 
tax haven subsidiaries, as well as, gross profit margin.
RESULTS
H1 posits a significant negative relationship between the number of 
subsidiaries and the extent of ETR yielded. This explains that high number 
of subsidiaries will result in lower ETR. The number of subsidiaries of β1 = 
0.368, where ETR increases on average by 0.368% for each additional unit 
increase in the number of subsidiaries, net of the effects of changes due to 
tax haven subsidiaries and gross profit margins. The result yields a positive 
relationship between number of subsidiaries and ETR. Although there is 
an increase in the number of subsidiaries that cause a potential increase in 
RPT, the RPT may not have been manipulated for tax evasion schemes and 
transfer mispricing practices. Thus, H1 is rejected. 
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H2 shows a significant negative relationship between the number of 
tax haven subsidiaries and the extent of ETR yielded. This means that when 
a PLC has more tax haven subsidiaries, the extent of ETR will decrease 
proportionately. The number of tax haven subsidiaries of β2 = -0.231, 
where ETR will decrease, on average, by 0.231%, for each additional 
unit increase in tax haven subsidiaries, net of the effects of changes due 
to number of subsidiaries and gross profit margins. Thus, the transaction 
may amount to plausible tax schemes if there is no proper control from the 
authority. Thus, H2 is accepted. Therefore, the level of risk indicators of 
transfer pricing is high when PLCs form more tax haven subsidiaries, as 
they may reduce the ETR.
H3 shows a significant positive relationship between gross profit 
margin incurred by a PLC and the extent of ETR yielded. This means that 
when gross profit margin incurred by a PLC is high, there is also high ETR 
yielded. The gross profit margin of β3 = 0.145, where ETR will increase, 
on average, by 0.145%, for each additional one per cent increase in gross 
profit margin, net of the effects of changes due to number of subsidiaries 
and tax haven subsidiaries. Therefore, H3 is accepted. Thus, the level of 
risk indicators of transfer pricing is low when PLCs generate good profits, 
as they also need to pay high tax.
CONCLUSION 
This study is to examine whether number of subsidiaries, tax haven 
subsidiaries, and gross profit margin can contribute in predicting transfer 
pricing practices through the measurement of ETR yielded of those selected 
PLCs. The samples comprised of 70 PLCs from seven types of industries. 
The main criterion for the selection of these PLCs is that they should 
have a subsidiary, besides based the OECD Guidelines 2012 and IRBM 
Guideline. The period covered was based on financial data of five years, 
i.e., 2009 until 2013.
Based on the results obtained, tax haven subsidiaries and gross profit 
margin can be used to predict the transfer pricing practices by using the ETR 
yielded. The higher the number of tax haven subsidiaries, the less amount 
of ETR yielded. The same situation also applies for gross profit margin. 
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The higher the gross profit margin, the higher the ETR yielded as a result 
of sound financial performance. Therefore, these two results may indicate 
a plausible transfer mispricing practices. 
 
There are two main implications from this study. First, since tax 
planning is a legal reduction of tax, it is still prone to be manipulated as 
transfer pricing is a mechanism that is carried out based on a subjective 
valuation. The second implication is that on the extent of the effect of tax 
planning procedures in lowering ETR yielded. The inability to distinguish 
between tax planning approach and tax avoidance technique may affect 
the tax planning theory as if the latter is also illegitimate and unlawful to 
be initiated. 
From the perspective of a practitioner, transfer pricing provides a 
solution for an easy business interaction among subsidiaries and affiliated 
companies. However, the practitioner needs to be aware of the validity of 
the transactions between subsidiaries as the opaque and vague elements 
that surround the transfer pricing may open to a malpractice initiated by 
bigger firms to gain a fair advantage such as increasing profits alongside 
reducing the tax bills. The results also have significant implications for tax 
authorities and other related organizations where it should help these entities 
to tackle tax audit problems more efficiently and set the risk parameter 
before embarking on any investigation process by having a list of priority. 
However, several limitations of the study should be noted. Firstly, 
this study was conducted using the financial data from PLCs and could 
not be extended to those private firms as the financial statements were not 
publicly available even though these firms are not free from transfer pricing 
manipulation practices. Besides, firms that do not have any subsidiary are 
excluded as transfer pricing requires a subsidiary to do at least a transfer 
price. Furthermore, the samples selected were relatively small in size as 
they were limited to ten PLCs from seven industries. According to Liou 
and Yang (2008), an extreme observation might change the result when the 
sample size is very small in empirical studies. Lastly, the number of ordinary 
subsidiaries alongside the tax haven subsidiaries a firm has is based on the 
2013 Annual Report, which is due to the slight variation between the years 
where most of the companies are sticking to their subsidiaries without 
removing it from their books. 
357
The PredicTion of Transfer Pricing ManiPulaTion
This study recommends for the risk indicators to be extended to all the 
nine available aspects as per stated in the OECD Guidelines 2012 to provide 
more robust analyzes of transfer pricing landscape. In addition, the sample 
size also needs to be extended to more than just seventy PLCs and cover 
more industries as the analysis result will be more robust. Furthermore, the 
extension on the data is recommended as the research was only using the 
2013 annual reports as the benchmark for the information regarding those 
PLCs subsidiaries. 
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